CVE-2026-59440

Resource Injection
Affects
Spring Cloud Function
in
Spring
No items found.
Versions
>=4.0.0 <=4.2.4, >=4.3.0 <=4.3.4, >=5.0.0 <=5.0.5

Patch Available.

Exclamation circle icon
Patch Available

This Vulnerability has been fixed in the Never-Ending Support (NES) version offered by HeroDevs.

Overview

Spring Cloud Function is a Spring project that promotes implementing business logic as functions and decouples that logic from any specific runtime target, so the same code can run as a web endpoint, a stream processor, or a task.

A resource injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-59440) has been identified in the JsonMessageConverter of Spring Cloud Function, which allows attackers to make the application load JDK system or platform classes named in a message's content type and convert the message payload into them.

Per OWASP: This attack consists of changing resource identifiers used by an application in order to perform a malicious task.

This issue affects multiple versions of Spring Cloud Function.

Details

Module Info

Vulnerability Info

This Low-severity vulnerability is found in the spring-cloud-function-context package in multiple versions of Spring Cloud Function. As a feature, Spring Cloud Function lets a message specify the type its JSON payload should be converted to through the type parameter of its content type, for example application/json;type=com.example.Order. When the target type of a function cannot be resolved more precisely than Object, JsonMessageConverter.convertFromInternal reads that parameter and loads the named class through the thread context class loader:

MimeType mimeType = getMimeType(message.getHeaders());
String type = mimeType.getParameter("type");
if (StringUtils.hasText(type)) {
        try {
                convertToType = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().loadClass(type);
        }
        catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
                throw new IllegalArgumentException("Failed to load class `" + type + "` specified by the provided content-type: " + mimeType, e);
        }
}

The resolved class is then passed to this.jsonMapper.fromJson(message.getPayload(), convertToType), which builds an instance of it from the payload. Nothing checks which class loader defined the class, so a sender who controls the content type of a message can name any JDK class from the bootstrap or platform class loader, such as a java.* type, and have the payload deserialized into it. Some releases also compare the name against a configured list of deserializable types before loading it, but the list check alone still accepts a JDK system or platform class whenever its name is on the list.

Mitigation

Only recent versions of Spring Cloud Function receive community support. Older lines are End-of-Life and will not receive public updates to address this issue.

Users of the affected components should apply one of the following mitigations:

  • Upgrade to a currently supported version of Spring Cloud Function.
  • Leverage a commercial support partner like HeroDevs for post-EOL security support.

Credits

Vulnerability Details
Severity
Level
CVSS Assessment
Low
>=0 <4
Medium
>=4 <6
High
>=6 <8
Critical
>=8 <10
Low
ID
CVE-2026-59440
PROJECT Affected
Spring Cloud Function
Versions Affected
>=4.0.0 <=4.2.4, >=4.3.0 <=4.3.4, >=5.0.0 <=5.0.5
NES Versions Affected
Published date
November 20, 2026
≈ Fix date
Category
Resource Injection
Vex Document
Download VEXHow do I use it?
Sign up for the latest vulnerability alerts fixed in
NES for Spring
Rss feed icon
Subscribe via RSS
or

By submitting the form I acknowledge receipt of our Privacy Policy.

Thanks for signing up for our Newsletter! We look forward to connecting with you.
Oops! Something went wrong while submitting the form.