CVE-2026-59419
Patch Available.
This Vulnerability has been fixed in the Never-Ending Support (NES) version offered by HeroDevs.
Overview
Spring Framework is the foundational Java application framework of the Spring portfolio, providing dependency injection, transaction management, web applications with Spring MVC and Spring WebFlux, and HTTP clients such as RestTemplate, RestClient and WebClient.
A denial of service vulnerability (CVE-2026-59419) has been identified in the default HTTP client observation conventions of Spring Framework's spring-web and spring-webflux modules, which allows attackers to exhaust application memory by sending requests whose HTTP method the application forwards to a downstream service. Each distinct method creates a new http.client.requests metric.
Per OWASP: The Denial of Service (DoS) attack is focused on making a resource (site, application, server) unavailable for the purpose it was designed.
This issue affects multiple versions of Spring Framework.
Details
Module Info
- Product: Spring Framework
- Affected packages:
org.springframework:spring-web,org.springframework:spring-webflux - Affected versions: >=6.0.0 <=6.0.32, >=6.1.0 <=6.1.29, >=6.2.0 <=6.2.20, >=7.0.0 <=7.0.10
- GitHub repository: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework
- Published packages:
- Package manager: Maven
- Fixed in:
- OSS Spring Framework 7.0.11
- NES for Spring Framework
Vulnerability Info
This Medium-severity vulnerability is found in the org.springframework:spring-web and org.springframework:spring-webflux packages in multiple versions of Spring Framework. When an ObservationRegistry is configured and Micrometer metrics are enabled, RestTemplate, RestClient and WebClient record each request as an http.client.requests observation, named and tagged by DefaultClientRequestObservationConvention. The convention's method() key value is declared low-cardinality, so every distinct value becomes a separate meter that the metrics registry keeps in memory.
In spring-web, used by RestTemplate and RestClient, the convention copies the request method name into that key without checking it:
protected KeyValue method(ClientRequestObservationContext context) {
if (context.getCarrier() != null) {
return KeyValue.of(LowCardinalityKeyNames.METHOD, context.getCarrier().getMethod().name());
}
else {
return METHOD_NONE;
}
}The WebClient convention in spring-webflux does the same with context.getRequest().method().name().
HttpMethod accepts arbitrary method names, so the value is unbounded. An application is exposed when it uses the default convention, sends client requests with an HTTP method chosen by a remote user (for example by forwarding the method of an incoming request to a downstream service), and its ClientHttpRequestFactory or ClientHttpConnector accepts non-standard HTTP methods. An attacker can then send many requests, each with a different made-up method, and every one creates a new http.client.requests meter until the application runs out of memory. The server-side observation conventions and the reference documentation already report none for methods that are not well known; the client conventions did not.
Mitigation
Only recent versions of Spring Framework receive community support. Older lines are End-of-Life and will not receive public updates to address this issue.
Users of the affected components should apply one of the following mitigations:
- Upgrade to a currently supported version of Spring Framework.
- Leverage a commercial support partner like HeroDevs for post-EOL security support.
Credits
YLChen-007 (finder)