CVE-2026-59392
Patch Available.
This Vulnerability has been fixed in the Never-Ending Support (NES) version offered by HeroDevs.
Overview
Spring Framework is an open-source application framework that provides comprehensive infrastructure support for building Java applications. Its spring-messaging module provides STOMP messaging support, including user destinations that let an application send messages to the sessions of a specific user over WebSocket or SockJS.
An information exposure vulnerability (CVE-2026-59392) has been identified in Spring Framework's STOMP over SockJS support, which allows an authenticated attacker to receive messages intended for another user's active session. An application is affected if it uses STOMP messaging with the SockJS transport and sends messages to specific users, for example with SimpMessagingTemplate.convertAndSendToUser.
Per OWASP: Access control enforces policy such that users cannot act outside of their intended permissions. Failures typically lead to unauthorized information disclosure, modification, or destruction of all data or performing a business function outside the user's limits.
This issue affects multiple versions of Spring Framework.
Details
Module Info
- Product: Spring Framework
- Affected packages:
org.springframework:spring-messaging - Affected versions: <=5.2.26.RELEASE, >=5.3.0 <=5.3.50, >=6.0.0 <=6.0.32, >=6.1.0 <=6.1.29, >=6.2.0 <=6.2.20, >=7.0.0 <=7.0.10
- GitHub repository: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework
- Published packages: https://central.sonatype.com/artifact/org.springframework/spring-messaging
- Package manager: Maven
- Fixed in:
- OSS Spring Framework 7.0.11
- NES for Spring Framework
Vulnerability Info
This Medium-severity vulnerability is found in the org.springframework:spring-messaging package in multiple versions of Spring Framework.
When a client subscribes to a user destination such as /user/queue/foo, DefaultUserDestinationResolver translates it into a destination unique to the client's session by appending the raw session id:
for (String sessionId : sessionIds) {
String actualDest = parseResult.getActualDestination();
String targetDest = getTargetDestination(sourceDest, actualDest, sessionId, user);
if (targetDest != null) {
targetSet.add(targetDest);
}
}
protected String getTargetDestination(String sourceDestination, String actualDestination,
String sessionId, @Nullable String user) {
return actualDestination + "-user" + sessionId;
}With the SockJS transport, the session id is a segment of the request URL and is chosen by the client. AbstractSockJsService.validateRequest only rejects empty session ids and session ids containing a ., so the pattern characters *, ?, { and } are accepted.
The simple broker's DefaultSubscriptionRegistry checks every new subscription destination with pathMatcher.isPattern(destination) and, when it is a pattern, matches outgoing messages against it with pathMatcher.match(...). An authenticated attacker who opens a SockJS session with an id such as * and subscribes to /user/queue/foo therefore registers the pattern subscription /queue/foo-user*. When the application sends a message to another user with convertAndSendToUser, the message is published to /queue/foo-user<victimSessionId>, which matches the attacker's pattern, and the broker delivers the victim's message to the attacker as well.
Mitigation
Only recent versions of Spring Framework receive community support. Older lines are End-of-Life and will not receive public updates to address this issue.
Users of the affected components should apply one of the following mitigations:
- Upgrade to a currently supported version of Spring Framework.
- Leverage a commercial support partner like HeroDevs for post-EOL security support.
Credits
Daehyun Kang (finder)