CVE-2026-59365

Resource Injection
Affects
Spring Integration
in
Spring
No items found.
Versions
<=5.5.22, >=6.0.0 <=6.4.13, >=6.5.0 <=6.5.11, >=7.0.0 <=7.0.7, >=7.1.0 <=7.1.2

Patch Available.

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Patch Available

This Vulnerability has been fixed in the Never-Ending Support (NES) version offered by HeroDevs.

Overview

Spring Integration extends the Spring programming model to support the well-known Enterprise Integration Patterns. It enables lightweight messaging within Spring-based applications and supports integration with external systems through declarative adapters, including adapters for AMQP brokers such as RabbitMQ.

A resource injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-59365) has been identified in the default inbound header mapper of Spring Integration AMQP, which allows attackers who can publish messages to a consumed RabbitMQ queue to set the replyChannel and errorChannel headers. These headers can redirect replies or error messages to another channel in the application.

Per OWASP: This attack consists of changing resource identifiers used by an application in order to perform a malicious task.

This issue affects multiple versions of Spring Integration.

Details

Module Info

Vulnerability Info

This Medium-severity vulnerability is found in the org.springframework.integration:spring-integration-amqp package in multiple versions of Spring Integration. The vendor rates it CVSS 3.1 6.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L).

All AMQP inbound components, such as AmqpInboundChannelAdapter, AmqpInboundGateway, AmqpMessageSource and AMQP-backed message channels, use DefaultAmqpHeaderMapper.inboundMapper() unless a header mapper is configured explicitly. That mapper takes its request header patterns from inboundRequestHeaders(), which matches every header name:

public static DefaultAmqpHeaderMapper inboundMapper() {
        return new DefaultAmqpHeaderMapper(inboundRequestHeaders(), inboundReplyHeaders());
}

public static String[] inboundRequestHeaders() {
        return new String[] {"*"};
}

Because of the * pattern, every application header on an incoming AMQP message is copied into the Spring Integration message headers, including the framework-significant replyChannel and errorChannel headers. Spring Integration later resolves the values of these headers as MessageChannel bean names. A party that can publish to a queue the application consumes can therefore name any channel bean in the application: the output of a reply-producing handler that has no explicit output channel is sent to the attacker's chosen channel, and so are error messages raised while the message is processed. Depending on what the target channel feeds, this can route messages into flows they were never meant to reach.

Mitigation

Only recent versions of Spring Integration receive community support. Older lines are End-of-Life and will not receive public updates to address this issue.

Where an upgrade is not immediately possible, configure the inbound DefaultAmqpHeaderMapper with explicit request header names that list only the expected headers, or that exclude the framework-significant ones:

DefaultAmqpHeaderMapper mapper = DefaultAmqpHeaderMapper.inboundMapper();
mapper.setRequestHeaderNames("!replyChannel", "!errorChannel", "*");

Users of the affected components should apply one of the following mitigations:

  • Upgrade to a currently supported version of Spring Integration.
  • Leverage a commercial support partner like HeroDevs for post-EOL security support.
Vulnerability Details
Severity
Level
CVSS Assessment
Low
>=0 <4
Medium
>=4 <6
High
>=6 <8
Critical
>=8 <10
Medium
ID
CVE-2026-59365
PROJECT Affected
Spring Integration
Versions Affected
<=5.5.22, >=6.0.0 <=6.4.13, >=6.5.0 <=6.5.11, >=7.0.0 <=7.0.7, >=7.1.0 <=7.1.2
NES Versions Affected
Published date
November 20, 2026
≈ Fix date
Category
Resource Injection
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