CVE-2026-59363
Patch Available.
This Vulnerability has been fixed in the Never-Ending Support (NES) version offered by HeroDevs.
Overview
Spring Integration extends the Spring programming model to support Enterprise Integration Patterns, providing lightweight messaging within Spring-based applications and channel adapters for integrating with external systems such as MQTT brokers.
A resource injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-59363) has been identified in the MQTT v5 inbound channel adapter of Spring Integration, which allows attackers who can publish to a subscribed topic to set framework-significant message headers such as replyChannel and errorChannel. This lets them redirect replies or error messages, including the attacker payload, to another channel in the application.
Per OWASP: This attack consists of changing resource identifiers used by an application in order to perform a malicious task. When an application defines a resource type or location based on user input, such as a file name or port number, this data can be manipulated to execute or access different resources.
This issue affects multiple versions of Spring Integration.
Details
Module Info
- Product: Spring Integration
- Affected packages:
org.springframework.integration:spring-integration-mqtt - Affected versions: >=5.5.5 <=5.5.22, >=6.0.0 <=6.4.13, >=6.5.0 <=6.5.11, >=7.0.0 <=7.0.7, >=7.1.0 <=7.1.2
- GitHub repository: https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-integration
- Published packages: https://central.sonatype.com/artifact/org.springframework.integration/spring-integration-mqtt
- Package manager: Maven
- Fixed in:
- OSS Spring Integration 7.0.8, 7.1.3
- NES for Spring Integration
Vulnerability Info
This Medium-severity vulnerability is found in the org.springframework.integration:spring-integration-mqtt package in multiple versions of Spring Integration.
MQTT v5 PUBLISH packets carry arbitrary user properties chosen by the publisher. MqttHeaderMapper, the default header mapper of Mqttv5PahoMessageDrivenChannelAdapter, maps inbound properties whose names match its inboundHeaderNames patterns, and that list defaults to the wildcard *:
private String[] inboundHeaderNames = {"*"};
@Override
public Map<String, Object> toHeaders(MqttProperties source) {
Map<String, Object> headers = new HashMap<>();
...
List<UserProperty> userProperties = source.getUserProperties();
for (UserProperty userProperty : userProperties) {
String name = userProperty.getKey();
if (shouldMapHeader(name, this.inboundHeaderNames)) {
headers.put(name, userProperty.getValue());
}
}
return headers;
}No framework-significant header names are excluded, so every user property becomes a message header. The adapter then builds the Spring Integration message directly from those headers:
@Override
public void messageArrived(String topic, MqttMessage mqttMessage) {
Map<String, Object> headers = this.headerMapper.toHeaders(mqttMessage.getProperties());
...
message = new GenericMessage<>(payload, headers);A user property named replyChannel or errorChannel is therefore carried into the message, and the framework later resolves its value as a MessageChannel bean name. A reply-producing handler without an explicit output channel sends its result to the attacker-chosen channel, and error messages, which embed the attacker payload, are routed the same way. If that channel forwards to an external system, the attacker can move data or trigger flows the application never meant to expose to MQTT publishers. Applications using Mqttv5PahoMessageDrivenChannelAdapter with the default header mapping are affected.
Mitigation
Only recent versions of Spring Integration receive community support. Older lines are End-of-Life and will not receive public updates to address this issue.
Users of the affected components should apply one of the following mitigations:
- Upgrade to a currently supported version of Spring Integration.
- Leverage a commercial support partner like HeroDevs for post-EOL security support.