CVE-2026-116472

Improper Input Validation (4.16)
Affects
registry.k8s.io/ingress-nginx/controller; ingress-nginx Helm chart
in
Ingress NGINX
No items found.
Versions
>=0.29.0 <=1.15.1

Patch Available.

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Patch Available

This Vulnerability has been fixed in the Never-Ending Support (NES) version offered by HeroDevs.

Overview

Ingress NGINX is a Kubernetes Ingress controller that uses NGINX as a reverse proxy and load balancer. Cluster users configure it through Ingress resources and annotations, and the controller turns them into NGINX configuration.

An Improper Input Validation vulnerability (CVE-2026-116472) has been identified in the handling of the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/mirror-target Ingress annotation, which allows users who can create or modify Ingress resources to write to the controller's unauthenticated internal configuration API and drop all traffic through the controller. See the upstream advisory, kubernetes/kubernetes#143852.

Per MITRE CWE-20: The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

This issue affects Ingress NGINX 0.29.0 through 1.15.1, the final upstream release.

Details

Module Info

Vulnerability Info

The Kubernetes Security Response Committee, as CNA, rates this issue Low with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 2.7 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L).

The controller pushes dynamic configuration (backends, servers, certificates and general settings) into NGINX over HTTP. NGINX serves this API from an internal server bound to 127.0.0.1:10246, where the /configuration location is handled by configuration.lua. The API has no authentication and relies on the loopback binding to keep it private. Separately, the mirror-target annotation makes NGINX send a copy of every request for an Ingress to a URL the Ingress author chooses. The controller writes that URL straight into the proxy_pass of an internal mirror location in internal/ingress/controller/template/template.go:

        buffer.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(`location = %v {
internal;
proxy_set_header Host %v;
proxy_pass %v;
}

`, strconv.Quote(loc.Mirror.Source), strconv.Quote(loc.Mirror.Host), strconv.Quote(loc.Mirror.Target)))

Nothing stops the mirror target from pointing at the controller's own loopback address. Mirrored requests are sent by NGINX from inside the controller pod, so they reach the configuration API, and they carry the original method and request body because mirror-request-body defaults to on. The API checks only that the method is GET or POST and then dispatches on the path, with no check on who sent the request, before it replaces shared state in rootfs/etc/nginx/lua/configuration.lua (excerpt from v1.15.1):

  if ngx.var.request_uri == "/configuration/general" then
    handle_general()
    return
  end

  if ngx.var.uri == "/configuration/certs" then
    handle_certs()
    return
  end

  if ngx.var.request_uri == "/configuration/backends" then
    handle_backends()
    return
  end

An Ingress author can therefore set mirror-target to http://127.0.0.1:10246/configuration/backends and send a POST to their own host with a malformed body. The mirrored request overwrites the backend list, and all traffic through the controller is dropped until the next Ingress change or a controller restart rebuilds the data. The CNA notes that the same write access could in principle redirect traffic from other Ingresses, but that this adds negligible risk, since it requires internal controller state and Ingress authors can already redirect traffic through the same controller.

Exposure depends on who can create or modify Ingress resources watched by the controller. mirror-target is a High-risk annotation, and the default annotations-risk-level in 1.15.1 is High, so it is accepted by default. Clusters where only administrators create Ingress resources, or where High-risk annotations are disallowed, have little exposure.

The Kubernetes project will not fix this issue because Ingress NGINX maintenance ended in March 2026. SUSE fixed it in its Rancher fork (rancher/ingress-nginx#242) by marking mirror subrequests with an X-Ingress-Nginx-Mirror: 1 header in buildMirrorLocations and rejecting marked requests in the configuration API:

function _M.call()
  if ngx.var.http_x_ingress_nginx_mirror == "1" then
    ngx.status = ngx.HTTP_FORBIDDEN
    return
  end

NES for Ingress NGINX 1.15.11 uses the same approach, and rejects any request that carries the marker header, whatever its value, so a client-supplied header cannot get around the check.

Mitigation

The upstream project only fixes supported lines. Ingress NGINX reached End-of-Life in March 2026, and Ingress NGINX 0.29.0 through 1.15.1 will not receive any public updates to address this issue.

As a stopgap, use an admission controller to reject Ingress resources that set the mirror-target annotation, or set the annotations-risk-level ConfigMap key to Medium or Low. Localhost addresses in a mirror-target annotation may indicate an attempt to exploit this issue.

Users of the affected components should apply one of the following mitigations:

  • No upstream fix is available. Restrict use of the mirror-target annotation as described above.
  • Leverage a commercial support partner like HeroDevs (NES for Ingress NGINX) for post-EOL security support.

Credits

Vulnerability Details
Severity
Level
CVSS Assessment
Low
>=0 <4
Medium
>=4 <6
High
>=6 <8
Critical
>=8 <10
Low
ID
CVE-2026-116472
PROJECT Affected
registry.k8s.io/ingress-nginx/controller; ingress-nginx Helm chart
Versions Affected
>=0.29.0 <=1.15.1
NES Versions Affected
Published date
November 19, 2026
≈ Fix date
November 17, 2026
Category
Improper Input Validation (4.16)
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